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Abstract: Starting with the work of Ishai-Sahai-Wagner and Micali-Reyzin, a new goal has been
set within the theory of cryptography community, to design cryptographic primitives that are secure
against large classes of side-channel attacks. Recently, many works have focused on designing various
cryptographic primitives that are robust (retain security) even when the secret key is “leaky”, under
various intractability assumptions. In this work we propose to take a step back and ask a more basic
question: which of our cryptographic assumptions (rather than cryptographic schemes) are robust in
presence of leakage of their underlying secrets?
Our main result is that the hardness of the learning with error (LWE) problem implies its hardness with
leaky secrets. More generally, we show that the standard LWE assumption implies that LWE is secure
even if the secret is taken from an arbitrary distribution with sufficient entropy, and even in the presence
of hard-to-invert auxiliary inputs. We exhibit various applications of this result.
1. Under the standard LWE assumption, we construct a symmetric-key encryption scheme that is
robust to secret key leakage, and more generally maintains security even if the secret key is taken
from an arbitrary distribution with sufficient entropy (and even in the presence of hard-to-invert
auxiliary inputs).
2. Under the standard LWE assumption, we construct a (weak) obfuscator for the class of point func-
tions with multi-bit output.
We note that in most schemes that are known to be robust to leakage, the parameters of the scheme
depend on the maximum leakage the system can tolerate, and hence the efficiency degrades with the
maximum anticipated leakage, even if no leakage occurs at all! In contrast, the fact that we rely on a
robust assumption allows us to construct a single symmetric-key encryption scheme, with parameters
that are independent of the anticipated leakage, that is robust to any leakage (as long as the secret key
has sufficient entropy left over). Namely, for any k < n (where n is the size of the secret key), if the
secret key has only entropy k, then the security relies on the LWE assumption with secret size roughly k.
Keywords: Leakage-resilient Cryptography, Learning with Errors, Symmetric-key Encryption, Pro-
gram Obfuscation.
1 Introduction
The development of the theory of cryptogra-
phy, starting from the foundational work in the
early 80’s has led to rigorous definitions of se-
curity, mathematical modeling of cryptographic
goals, and what it means for a cryptographic al-
gorithm to achieve the stated security goals.
A typical security definition builds on the fol-
lowing framework: a cryptographic algorithm is
modeled as a Turing machine (whose description
is known to all) initialized with a secret key. Ad-
versarial entities, modeled as arbitrary (probabilis-
tic) polynomial-time machines have input/output
access to the algorithm. The requirement is that it
is infeasible for any such adversary to “break” the
system at hand. The (often implicit) assumption in
such a definition is that the secret keys used by the
algorithm are perfectly secret and chosen afresh for
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the algorithm. In practice, however, information
about keys does get compromised for a variety of
reasons, including: various side-channel attacks,
the use of the same secret key across several ap-
plications, or the use of correlated and imperfect
sources of randomness to generate the keys. In
short, adversaries in the real world can typically
obtain information about the secret keys other than
through the prescribed input/output interface.
In recent years, starting with the work of
Ishai, Sahai and Wagner [19] and Micali and
Reyzin [21], a new goal has been set within the
theory of cryptography community to build gen-
eral theories of security in the presence of infor-
mation leakage. A large body of work has accu-
mulated by now (see [1, 3, 6, 8, 12–14, 14, 16, 19,
21, 22, 25, 26, 28] and the references therein) in
which security against different classes of informa-
tion leakage has been defined, and different crypto-
graphic primitives have been designed to provably
withstand these attacks. A set of works particularly
relevant to our work are those that design crypto-
graphic primitives which are “robust” in the fol-
lowing sense: they remain secure even in the pres-
ence of attacks which obtain arbitrary polynomial-
time computable information about the secret keys,
as long as “the secret key is not fully revealed”
(either information theoretically or computation-
ally) [1, 11, 12, 20, 22].
In this paper, we turn our attention to the notion
of robust cryptographic assumptions rather than
robust cryptographic constructions.
Robustness of Cryptographic Assumptions
Suppose one could make a non-standard as-
sumption of the form “cryptographic assumption
A holds even in the presence of arbitrary leakage
of its secrets”. An example would be that the fac-
toring problem is hard even given partial informa-
tion about the prime factors. Once we are at liberty
to make such an assumption, the task of coming
up with leakage-resilient cryptographic algorithms
becomes substantially easier. However, such as-
sumptions are rather unappealing, unsubstantiated
and sometimes (as in the case of factoring) even
false! (See below.)
In addition, it is often possible to show that a
quantitatively stronger hardness assumption trans-
lates to some form of leakage-resilience. For ex-
ample, the assumption that the discrete logarithm
problem is 2k-hard (for some k > 0) directly im-
plies its security in the presence of roughly k bits
of leakage.1 However, in practice, what is inter-
esting is a cryptographic assumption that is secure
against leakage of a constant fraction of its secret.
The problem with the above approach is that it
fails this goal, since none of the cryptographic as-
sumptions in common use are 2O(N)-hard to break
(where N is the length of the secret key).
Thus, most of the recent work on leakage-
resilient cryptography focuses on constructing
cryptographic schemes whose leakage-resilience
can be reduced to standard cryptographic assump-
tions such as the polynomial hardness of problems
based on factoring, discrete-log or various lattice
problems, or in some cases, general assumptions
such as the existence of one-way functions.
However, a question that still remains is: Which
of the (standard) cryptographic assumptions are
themselves naturally “robust to leakage”. Specifi-
cally:
• Is it hard to factor an RSA composite N =
pq (where p and q are random n-bit primes)
given arbitrary, but bounded, information
about p and q?
• Is it hard to compute x given gx (mod p),
where p is a large prime and x is uniformly
random given arbitrary, but bounded, infor-
mation about x?
As for factoring with leakage, there are known
negative results: a long line of results starting from
the early work of Rivest and Shamir [29] show how
to factor N = pq given a small fraction of the
bits of one of the factors [10, 17]. Similar nega-
tive results are known for the RSA problem, and
the square-root extraction problem.
As for the discrete-logarithm problem with leak-
age, it could very well be hard. In fact, an assump-
tion of this nature has been put forward by Canetti
and used to construct an obfuscator for point func-
tions [7], and later to construct a symmetric en-
cryption scheme that is robust to leakage [9]. How-
ever, we do not have any evidence for the validity
of such an assumption, and in particular, we are
far from showing that a standard cryptographic as-
sumption implies the discrete-log assumption with
leakage.
1It is worth noting that such an implication is not entirely
obvious for decisional assumptions.
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Recently, Dodis, Kalai and Lovett [12] consider
this question in the context of the learning parity
with noise (LPN) problem. They showed that the
LPN assumption with leakage follows from a re-
lated, but non-standard assumption they introduce,
called the learning subspaces with noise (LSN) as-
sumption.
In light of this situation, we ask:
Is there a standard cryptographic
assumption that is robust with leakage?
Our first contribution is to show that the learn-
ing with errors (LWE) assumption [27] that
has recently gained much popularity (and whose
average-case complexity is related to the worst-
case complexity of various lattice problems) is in
fact robust in the presence of leakage (see Sec-
tion 1.1 and Theorem 1 below for details).
Leakage versus Efficiency
Typically, the way leakage-resilient crypto-
graphic primitives are designed is as follows: first,
the designer determines the maximum amount of
leakage he is willing to tolerate. Then, the scheme
is designed, and the parameters of the scheme
(and hence its efficiency) depend on the maxi-
mum amount of leakage the scheme can tolerate.
The more this quantity is, the less efficient the
scheme becomes. In other words, the efficiency
of the scheme depends on the maximum antici-
pated amount of leakage. In cases where there is
no leakage at all in a typical operation of the sys-
tem, this is grossly inefficient. To our knowledge,
all known leakage-resilient cryptographic schemes
that rely on standard assumptions follow this de-
sign paradigm.
In contrast, what we would like is a scheme
whose security, and not efficiency, degrades with
the actual amount of leakage. In other words, we
would like to design a single scheme whose se-
curity with different amounts of leakage can be
proven under a (standard) cryptographic assump-
tion, with degraded parameters. The larger the
leakage, the stronger the security assumption. In
other words, the amount of leakage never shows
up in the design phase, and comes up only in the
proof of security. We call this a “graceful degrada-
tion of security”. This leads us to ask:
Are there cryptosystems that exhibit a
graceful degradation of security?
Our second contribution is a symmetric-key en-
cryption scheme with a graceful degradation of se-
curity. The construction is based on the LWE as-
sumption, and uses the fact that the LWE assump-
tion is robust to leakage. (See Section 1.1 and The-
orem 2 below for details.)
Our final contribution is a (weak) obfuscator for
the class of point functions with multi-bit output
with a graceful degradation of security. (See Sec-
tion 1.1 and Theorem 3 below for details.)
1.1 Our Results and Techniques
The learning with error (LWE) problem, intro-
duced by Regev [27] is a generalization of the
well-known “learning parity with noise” problem.
For a security parameter n, and a prime number q,
the LWE problem with secret s ∈ Znq is defined as
follows: given polynomially many random, noisy
linear equations in s, find s. More precisely, given
(ai, 〈ai, s〉 + xi), where ai ← Znq is uniformly
random, and xi is drawn from a “narrow error dis-
tribution”, the problem is to find s. The decisional
version of LWE is to distinguish between polyno-
mially many LWE samples {(ai, 〈ai, s〉+xi)} and
uniformly random samples. Typically, the LWE
problem is considered with a Gaussian-like error
distribution (see Section 2 for details). For nota-
tional convenience, we use a compact matrix no-
tation for LWE: we will denote m samples from
the LWE distribution compactly as (A,As + x),
where A is an m-by-n matrix over Zq .
Our confidence in the LWE assumption stems
from a worst-case to average-case reduction of
Regev [27], who showed that the (average-case,
search) LWE problem is (quantumly) as hard as the
approximation versions of various standard lattice
problems in the worst-case. Furthermore, the de-
cisional and search LWE problems are equivalent
(up to polynomial in q factors).
1.1.1 LWE with Weak Secrets
We prove that the LWE assumption is robust to
leakage. More generally, we prove that it is robust
to weak keys and to auxiliary input functions that
are (computationally) hard to invert. Namely, we
show that (for some setting of parameters) the stan-
dard LWE assumption implies that LWE is hard
even if the secret s is chosen from an arbitrary
distribution with sufficient min-entropy, and even
given arbitrary hard-to-invert auxiliary input f(s).
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For the sake of clarity, in the introduction we fo-
cus on the case that the secret s is distributed ac-
cording to an arbitrary distribution with sufficient
min-entropy, and defer the issue of auxiliary input
to the body of the paper (though all our theorems
hold also w.r.t. auxiliary inputs).
We show that if the modulus q is any super-
polynomial function of n, then the LWE assump-
tion with weak binary secrets (i.e., when the se-
cret s is distributed according to an arbitrary dis-
tribution over {0, 1}n with sufficient min-entropy)
follows from the standard LWE assumption. More
specifically, we show that the LWE assumption
where the secret s is drawn from an arbitrary weak
source with min-entropy k over {0, 1}n is true,
assuming the LWE assumption is true with uni-
form (but smaller) secrets from Z`q , where ` =
k−ω(logn)
log q . Namely, we reduce the LWE assump-
tion with weak keys to the standard LWE assump-
tion with “security parameter” `. A caveat is that
we need to assume that the (standard) LWE as-
sumption is true with a super-polynomial mod-
ulus q, and a super-polynomially small “error-
rate”. Translated into the worst-case regime us-
ing Regev’s worst-case to average-case reduction,
the assumption is that standard lattice problems
are (quantumly) hard to approximate with quasi-
polynomial time and within quasi-polynomial fac-
tors.2
Theorem 1 (Informal). For any super-polynomial
modulus q = q(n), any k ≥ log q, and any dis-
tribution D = {Dn}n∈N over {0, 1}n with min-
entropy k, the (non-standard) LWE assumption,
where the secret is drawn from the distribution D,
follows from the (standard) LWE assumption with
secret size ` , k−ω(logn)log q (where the “error-rate”
is super-polynomially small and the adversaries
run in time poly(n)).
We sketch the main ideas behind the proof of
this theorem. Let us first perform a mental ex-
periment where the matrix A in the definition of
the LWE problem is a non-full-rank matrix. i.e,
A = B · C where B ← Zm×`q and C ← Z`×nq
are uniformly random; this is a uniformly random
2By taking q to be smooth, and following an argument
from [23], our assumption translates to the assumption that
standard lattice problems are (quantumly) hard to approximate
in polynomial time and within super-polynomial factors.
matrix with rank at most ` (and exactly ` if both B
and C are full rank). The LWE distribution then
becomes
As+ x = B · (Cs) + x
At this point, we use the leftover hash lemma,3
which states that matrix multiplication over Zq
(and in fact, any universal hash function) acts as
a (strong) randomness extractor. In other words,
Cs is statistically close to a uniformly random vec-
tor t (even given C). Now, Bt + x is exactly the
LWE distribution with a uniformly random secret
t which, by the LWE assumption with security pa-
rameter `, is pseudorandom. It seems that we are
done, but that is not quite the case.
The problem is that B · C does not look any-
thing like a uniformly random m-by-n matrix; it is
in fact easily distinguishable from the uniform dis-
tribution. At first, one may be tempted to simply
change the LWE assumption, by choosing A =
B ·C as above, rather than a random m-by-n ma-
trix. The problem with this approach is that if C
is fixed then the min-entropy of the secret s may
depend onC, in which case we cannot use the left-
over hash lemma and claim that C · s is uniformly
distributed. On the other hand, if C is chosen at
random each time, then we essentially reduced the
problem of LWE with weak keys, to the problem
to LWE with related secrets C1s, . . .Cts, where
C1, . . . ,Ct are known.
We take a different approach: we use the LWE
assumption to “hide” the fact that B · C is not a
full-rank matrix. More precisely, we claim that
the matrix B · C + Z, where Z is chosen from
the LWE error distribution, is computationally in-
distinguishable from a uniformly random matrix
A ∈ Zm×nq . This is simply because each col-
umn B · ci + zi can be thought of as a bunch of
LWE samples with “secret” ci ∈ Z`q . By the LWE
assumption with security parameter `, this looks
random to a polynomial-time observer. This tech-
nique was used in the work of Alekhnovitch [2] in
the context of learning parity with noise, and was
later used in a number of works in the context of
the LWE assumption [24, 27].
An astute reader might have noticed that intro-
ducing this trick in fact undid the “extraction” ar-
3In the regime of auxiliary inputs, we use the Goldreich-
Levin theorem over Zq from the recent work of [11].
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gument. In particular, now one has to consider
(B ·C+ Z)s+ x = (B ·Cs) + Zs+ x
Indeed, B · Cs + x = Bt + x by itself is pseu-
dorandom (as before), but is not necessarily pseu-
dorandom after the addition of the correlated Zs
component. We mitigate this problem by using the
following elementary property of a Gaussian dis-
tribution: shifting a Gaussian distributed random
variable by any number that is super-polynomially
smaller than its standard deviation results in dis-
tribution that is statistically close to the original
Gaussian distribution. Thus, if we set each entry of
Z to be super-polynomially smaller than the stan-
dard deviation of x and choose s ∈ {0, 1}n, we
see that Zs + x is distributed statistically close to
a Gaussian. Namely, the noise x “eats up” the cor-
related and troublesome term Zs. This is where
the restrictions of the LWE secret s being binary,
as well as q being super-polynomial and the noise-
rate being negligibly smaller than q come into play.
1.1.2 Applications
Our main result has several applications.
We construct an efficient symmetric encryption
scheme secure against chosen plaintext attacks,
even if the secret key is chosen from an arbitrary
distribution with sufficient min-entropy (and even
in the presence of arbitrary hard-to-invert auxil-
iary input). We also construct an obfuscator for
the class of point functions with multi-bit output
I = {I(K,M)}, that is secure w.r.t. any distribu-
tion with sufficient min-entropy. A point function
with multi-bit output is a function I(K,M) that al-
ways outputs⊥, except on inputK in which it out-
puts M . Both of these results rely on the standard
LWE assumption.
Theorem 2 (Informal). For any super-polynomial
q = q(n) there is a symmetric-key encryption
scheme with the following property: For any k ≥
log q, the encryption scheme is CPA-secure when
the secret-key is drawn from an arbitrary distribu-
tion with min-entropy k. The assumption we rely
on is the (standard) LWE assumption with a secret
of size ` , k−ω(logn)log q (where the “error-rate” is
super-polynomially small and the adversaries run
in time poly(n)).
The encryption scheme is simple, and similar
versions of it were used in previous works [4, 12].
The secret-key is a uniformly random vector s ←
{0, 1}n. To encrypt a message w ∈ {0, 1}m, the
encryption algorithm computes
Es(w) = (A,As+ x+ q/2 ·w)
where A ∈R Zm×nq and each component of x is
drawn from the error distribution. To decrypt a ci-
phertext (A,y) using the secret-key s, the decryp-
tion algorithm computes y −As and it deciphers
each coordinate i ∈ [m] separately, as follows: If
the i’th coordinate of y −As is close to q/2 (i.e.,
between 3q8 and
5q
8 ) then it deciphers the i’th coor-
dinate of the message to be 1. If the i’th coordinate
of y−As is close to 0 or q (i.e., is smaller than q8 or
larger than 7q8 ) then it deciphers the i’th coordinate
of the message to be 0. Otherwise, it outputs ⊥.
The ciphertext corresponding to a message
w consists of polynomially many samples from
the LWE distribution with secret s, added to the
message vector. Robustness of LWE means that
the ciphertext is pseudorandom even if the secret
key is chosen from an arbitrary distribution with
min-entropy k (assuming that the standard LWE
assumption holds with secrets drawn from Z`q
where ` = (k − ω(log n))/ log q). The same
argument also shows that the scheme is secure
in the presence of computationally uninvertible
auxiliary input functions of s.
Finally, we use a very recent work Canetti et. al.
[9], that shows a tight connection between se-
cure encryption w.r.t. weak keys and obfuscation
of point functions with multi-bit output. The se-
curity definition that they (and we) consider is a
distributional one: Rather than requiring the ob-
fuscation to be secure w.r.t. every function in the
class, as defined in the seminal work of [5], se-
curity is required only when the functions are dis-
tributed according to a distribution with sufficient
min-entropy. Using this connection, together with
our encryption scheme described above, we get the
following theorem.
Theorem 3 (Informal). There exists an obfusca-
tor for the class of point functions with multi-bit
output under the (standard) LWE assumption.
1.2 Related Work
There is a long line of work that considers vari-
ous models of leakage [1, 3, 8, 9, 11, 11, 12, 14, 14,
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16, 19–22, 25, 26]. Still, most of the schemes that
are known to be resilient to leakage suffer from
the fact that the parameters of the scheme depend
on the maximum anticipated leakage, and thus
they are inefficient even in the absence of leakage!
There are a few exceptions. For example, the work
of [7, 9] exhibit a symmetric encryption scheme
that is based on a leakage-resilient DDH assump-
tion, which says that DDH holds even if one of
its secrets is taken from an arbitrary distribution
with sufficient min-entropy. We also mention sev-
eral results in the continual-leakage model which
rely on exponential hardness assumptions [14, 26].
We emphasize that all these examples rely on non-
standard assumptions.
The work of Katz and Vaikuntanathan [20] con-
structs signature schemes that are resilient to leak-
age. They, similarly to us, “push” the leak-
age to the assumption level. To construct their
signature schemes, they use the observation that
any collision-resistant hash function (and even a
universally one-way hash function) is a leakage-
resilient one-way function. In other words, they
use the fact that if h is collision-resistant, then
h(x) is hard to invert even given some partial in-
formation about the pre-image x. This can be in-
terpreted as saying that the collision-resistant hash
function assumption is a robust assumption.
This differs from our work in several ways. The
most significant difference is that we show that
pseudorandomness (and not only one-wayness) of
the LWE distribution is preserved in the pres-
ence of leakage. This enables us to construct
various cryptographic objects which we do not
know how to construct with the [20] assump-
tion. We mention that, whereas the [20] obser-
vation follows by a straightforward counting ar-
gument, our proof requires non-trivial computa-
tional arguments: roughly speaking, this is be-
cause the secret s is uniquely determined (and
thus has no information-theoretic entropy) given
the LWE samples (A,As + x). Thus, we have to
employ non-trivial computational claims to prove
our statements.
Finally, we would like to contrast our results
with those of Akavia et al. [1], who show that
the public-key encryption scheme of Regev [27]
based on LWE is in fact leakage-resilient. Un-
fortunately, achieving larger and larger leakage in
their scheme entails increasing the modulus q cor-
respondingly. Roughly speaking, to obtain robust-
ness against a leakage of (1− ) fraction of the se-
cret key, the modulus has to be at least n1/ (where
n is the security parameter). In short, the scheme
does not degrade gracefully with leakage (much
like the later works of [11, 22]). In fact, construct-
ing a public-key encryption scheme with a graceful
degradation of security remains a very interesting
open question.
2 Preliminaries
We will let n denote the main security parameter
throughout the paper. The notation X ≈c Y (resp.
X ≈s Y ) means that the random variables X and
Y are computationally indistinguishable (resp. sta-
tistically indistinguishable).
2.1 Learning with Errors (LWE)
The LWE problem was introduced by
Regev [27] as a generalization of the “learn-
ing noisy parities” problem. Let T = R/Z be
the reals modulo 1, represented by the interval
[0, 1). For positive integers n and q ≥ 2, a
vector s ∈ Znq , and a probability distribution φ
on R, let As,φ be the distribution over Znq × T
obtained by choosing a ∈ Znq uniformly at
random and an error term x ← φ, and outputting
(a, b = 〈a, s〉/q + x) ∈ Znq × T.
We also consider a discretized version of the
LWE distribution. For a distribution φ over R and
an (implicit) modulus q, let χ = φ¯ denote the
distribution over Z obtained by drawing x ← φ
and outputting bq · xe. The distribution As,χ over
Znq × Zq is obtained by choosing a ∈ Znq uni-
formly at random, an error term x ← χ, and out-
putting (a, b = 〈a, s〉+x), where all operations are
performed over Zq . (Equivalently, draw a sample
(a, b)← As,φ and output (a, bb · qe) ∈ Znq × Zq .)
Definition 1. For an integer q = q(n) and an er-
ror distribution φ = φ(n) over T, the (worst-case,
search) learning with errors problem LWEn,q,φ in
n dimensions is: given access to arbitrarily many
independent samples fromAs,φ, output s with non-
negligible probability. The problem for discretized
χ = φ¯ is defined similarly.
The (average-case) decision variant of the LWE
problem, denoted DLWEn,q,φ, is to distinguish,
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with non-negligible advantage given arbitrarily
many independent samples, the uniform distribu-
tion over Znq ×T fromAs,φ for a uniformly random
(and secret) s ∈ Znq . The problem for discretized
χ = φ¯ is defined similarly.
In this work, we are also concerned with
the average-case decision LWE problem where
the secret s is drawn from a distribution D
over Znq (which may not necessarily be the uni-
form distribution). We denote this problem by
DLWEn,q,φ(D).
Observe that simply by rounding, the
DLWEn,q,χ(D) problem is no easier than the
DLWEn,q,φ(D) problem, where χ = φ¯.
We are primarily interested in the LWE prob-
lems where the error distribution φ is a Gaussian.
For any α > 0, the density function of a one-
dimensional Gaussian probability distribution over
R is given by Dα(x) = exp(−pi(x/α)2)/α. We
write LWEn,q,α as an abbreviation for LWEn,q,Dα .
It is known [4, 23, 27] that for moduli q of a cer-
tain form, the (average-case decision) DLWEn,q,φ
problem is equivalent to the (worst-case search)
LWEn,q,φ problem, up to a poly(n) factor in the
number of samples used. In particular, this equiv-
alence holds for any q that is a product of suffi-
ciently large poly(n)-bounded primes.
Evidence for the hardness of LWEn,q,α fol-
lows from results of Regev [27] and Peikert [23],
who (informally speaking) showed that solving
LWEn,q,α (for appropriate parameters) is no eas-
ier than solving approximation problems on n-
dimensional lattices in the worst case. More pre-
cisely, under the hypothesis that q ≥ ω(√n)/α,
these reductions obtain O˜(n/α)-factor approxima-
tions for various worst-case lattice problems. (We
refer the reader to [23, 27] for the details.) Note
that if q  1/α, then the LWEn,q,α problem is
trivially solvable because the exact value of each
〈a, s〉 can be recovered (with high probability)
from its noisy version simply by rounding.
2.2 Leftover Hash Lemma
Informally, the leftover hash lemma [18] states
that any universal hash function acts as a random-
ness extractor. We will use a variant of this state-
ment applied to a particular universal hash func-
tion, i.e, matrix multiplication over Zq . In particu-
lar:
Lemma 1. Let D be a distribution over Znq with
min-entropy k. For any  > 0 and ` ≤ (k −
2 log(1/)−O(1))/ log q, the joint distribution of
(C,C · s) where C ← Z`×nq is uniformly random
and s ∈ Znq is drawn from the distribution D is -
close to the uniform distribution over Z`×nq × Z`q .
2.3 Goldreich-Levin Theorem over Zq
We also need a “computational version” of
the leftover hash lemma, which is essentially a
Goldreich-Levin type theorem over Zq . The origi-
nal Goldreich-Levin theorem proves that for every
uninvertible function h, 〈c, s〉 (mod 2) is pseudo-
random, given h(s) and c for a uniformly random
c ∈ Zn2 . Dodis et al. [11] (following the work
of Goldreich, Rubinfeld and Sudan [15]) show the
following variant of the Goldreich-Levin theorem
over a large field Zq .
Lemma 2. Let q be prime, and let H be any poly-
nomial size subset of Zq . Let f : Hn → {0, 1}∗
be any (possibly randomized) function. Let C ←
Z`×nq be uniformly random and s be drawn from
the distribution D over Hn.
If there is a PPT algorithm A that distinguishes
between (C,Cs) and the uniform distribution over
the range given h(s), then there is a PPT algorithm
B that inverts h(s) with probability roughly 1/(q` ·
poly(n, 1/)).
In other words, if h is (roughly) 1/q2`-hard
to invert (by polynomial-time algorithms), then
(C,C · s) is pseudorandom given h(s).
3 LWE with Weak Secrets
In this section, we show that if the modulus q
is some super-polynomial function of n, then the
LWE assumption with weak binary secrets (i.e.,
when the secret s is distributed according to an
arbitrary distribution over {0, 1}n with sufficient
min-entropy) follows from the standard LWE as-
sumption. More specifically, let s ∈ {0, 1}n be
any random variable with min-entropy k, and let
q = q(n) ∈ 2ω(logn) be any super-polynomial
function in n. Then, we show that for every m =
poly(n),
(A,As+ x) ≈c (A,u),
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where A ∈R Zm×nq , x ← Ψ
m
β and u ← Zmq . We
show this statement under the (standard) LWE as-
sumption with the following parameters: The se-
cret size is ` , k−ω(logn)log q , the number of exam-
ples remains m, and the standard deviation of the
noise is any γ such that γ/β = negl(n). An exam-
ple of a parameter setting that achieves the latter is
β = q/poly(n) and γ = poly(n).
Theorem 4. Let n, q ≥ 1 be integers, let D be
any distribution over {0, 1}n having min-entropy
at least k, and let α, β > 0 be such that α/β =
negl(n). Then for any ` ≤ k−ω(logn)log q , there is a
PPT reduction from DLWE`,q,α to DLWEn,q,β(D).
Remark 1. When converting the non-standard ver-
sion of the LWE assumption to the standard LWE
assumption we lose in two dimensions. The first
is that the secret size becomes ` , k−ω(logn)log q
rather than n. This loss seems to be inevitable
since in the non-standard assumption, although the
secret s was in {0, 1}n, it had only k bits of en-
tropy, so when converting this assumption to the
standard LWE assumption is seems like we can-
not hope to get a secret key with more than k bits
of entropy, which results with the key size being
at most k/ log q. We remark that the dimension `
can be increased to O(k− ω(log n)) (thus making
the underlying LWE assumption weaker) by con-
sider secrets s over Znq (rather than binary secrets).
This modification makes the proof of the theorem
a bit more cumbersome, and hence we choose not
to present it.
Another dimension in which we lose is in the
error distribution. The standard deviation of the
error distribution becomes γ which is negligibly
small compared to the original standard deviation
β. This loss which does not seem to be inherent,
and seems to be a byproduct of our proof, induces
the restriction on q to be super-polynomial in n.
Remark 2. The analogous statement for the search
version of LWE follows immediately from The-
orem 4 and the search to decision reduction for
LWE. However, doing so naively involves relying
on the assumption that LWE`,m,q,γ is hard (for the
parameters `,m, q and γ as above) for algorithms
that run in superpolynomial time. The superpoly-
nomial factor in the running time can be removed
by using the more involved search to decision re-
duction of Peikert [23] that uses a modulus q of a
special form.
3.1 Proof of Theorem 4
In the proof of Theorem 4 we rely on the follow-
ing lemma, which was proven in [11].
Lemma 3. Let β > 0 and q ∈ Z.
1. Let y ← Ψβ . Then with overwhelming prob-
ability, |y| ≤ βq · √n.
2. Let y ∈ Z be arbitrary. The statistical dis-
tance between the distributions Ψβ and Ψβ +
y is at most |y|/(βq).
Proof. Fix any q,m, k, `, β, γ as in the statement
theorem. We define the distribution Dγ , as fol-
lows: Let B ← Zm×`q and C ← Z`×nq be uni-
formly random and Z ← Ψm×nγ . Output the ma-
trix A′ = BC+Z. The following claim about the
distribution Dγ is then immediate:
Claim 1. Under the LWE`,m,q,γ Assumption, A′
is computationally indistinguishable from uniform
in Zm×nq .
Claim 1 implies that it suffices to prove that
(A′,A′s+ x) ≈c (A′,u).
Note that
A′s+ x = (BC+ Z)s+ x = BCs+ Zs+ x.
Thus, it suffices to prove that
(BC+ Z,BCs+ Zs+ x) ≈c (BC+ Z,u).
We prove the stronger statement that
(B,C,Z,BCs+ Zs+ x) ≈c (B,C,Z,u). (1)
The first item of Lemma 3 implies that with
overwhelming probability each entry of Z is of
size at most γq · √n. This implies that, with
overwhelming probability (over Z), for every s ∈
{0, 1}n each coordinate ofZs is of size at most γq·
n. Let x′ be a random variable distributed accord-
ing to (Ψβ)m. Then, the second item of Lemma 3
implies that for every i ∈ [m] the statistical dis-
tance between (Z, s,x′i) and (Z, s, (Zs)i + xi) is
at most γq·nβq . Using the fact that γ/β = negl(n),
we conclude that (Z, s,x′i) and (Z, s, (Zs)i + xi)
are statistically close, and thus that (Z, s,x′) and
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(Z, s,Zs + x) are statistically close. Therefore, it
suffices to prove that
(B,C,Z,BCs+ x′) ≈c (B,C,Z,u).
where x′ is drawn from Ψ
m
β .
The fact that Z is efficiently sampleable implies
that it suffices to prove that
(B,C,BCs+ x′) ≈c (B,C,u).
A standard application of leftover hash lemma [18]
using the fact that the min-entropy of s is at least
` log q + ω(log n) implies that
(C,Cs) ≈s (C,u)
Thus, the LWE`,m,q,β Assumption (which fol-
lows from the LWE`,m,q,γ Assumption), immedi-
ately implies that
(B,C,BCs+ x) ≈ (B,C,u),
as desired.
The same technique used to prove Theorem 4,
with the exception of using the Goldreich Levin
theorem over Zq (i.e, Lemma 2) instead of the left-
over hash lemma shows that the LWE assumption
holds even given auxiliary input h(s), where h is
any uninvertible function (See below). In essence,
the proof of the auxiliary input theorem below pro-
ceeds by using Lemma 2 to extract from the “com-
putational entropy” in the secret (as opposed to us-
ing the leftover hash lemma to extract from the
“information-theoretic entropy”).
Theorem 5. Let k ≥ log q, and let H be the class
of all functions h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}∗ that are 2−k
hard to invert, i.e, given h(s), no PPT algorithm
can find s with probability better than 2−k.
For any super-polynomial q = q(n), any m =
poly(n), any β, γ ∈ (0, q) such that γ/β =
negl(n)
(A,As+ x, h(s)) ≈c (A,u, h(s))
where A ← Zm×nq , s ← Znq and u ← Zmq are
uniformly random and x ← Ψmβ . assuming the
(standard) DLWE`,m,q,γ assumption, where ` ,
k−ω(logn)
log q .
4 Symmetric-Key Encryption Scheme
In this section we present a symmetric-key en-
cryption scheme that is secure even if the secret
key is distributed according to an arbitrary distri-
bution with sufficient min-entropy, assuming the
standard LWE assumption holds (for some setting
of parameters). More precisely, if the secret key
s ∈ {0, 1}n is distributed according to some dis-
tribution D min-entropy k then the assumption we
rely on is that there exists a super-polynomial func-
tion q = q(n) and a parameter β = q/poly(n) for
which DLWEk,q,β(D) holds. According to Theo-
rem 4, this assumption follows from the (standard)
assumption LWE`,q,γ , where ` , k−ω(logn)log q and γ
is any function that satisfies γ/q = negl(n).
4.1 The Scheme
We next describe our encryption scheme E =
(G,E,D), which is very similar to schemes that
appeared in previous work [4, 12].
• Parameters. Let q = q(n) be any super-
polynomial function, let β = q/poly(n), and
let m = poly(n).
• Key generation algorithm G. On input 1n,
G(1n) outputs a uniformly random secret key
s← {0, 1}n.
• Encryption algorithm E. On input a secret
key s and a message w ∈ {0, 1}m,




where A ∈R Zm×nq and x← (Ψβ)m.
• Decryption algorithm D. on input a secret
key s and a ciphertext (A,y), the decryption
algorithm computes y −As and it deciphers
each coordinate i ∈ [m] separately, as fol-
lows: If the i’th coordinate of y−As is close
to q/2, i.e., is between 3q8 and
5q
8 , then it
deciphers the i’th coordinate of the message
to 1. If the i’th coordinate of y − As is far
from q/2, i.e., is smaller than q8 or larger than
7q
8 , then it deciphers the i’th coordinate of the
message to 0. Otherwise, it outputs ⊥.
Remark. We note that, as opposed to most known
leakage resilient schemes, the parameters of this
scheme do not depend on any amount of leakage
(or min-entropy) that the scheme can tolerate.
Nevertheless, using Theorem 4, we are able to
prove that this scheme is secure w.r.t. weak keys,
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and in particular is leakage resilient. We empha-
size the change in the order of quantifiers: Rather
than proving that for every leakage parameter
there exists a scheme that is secure w.r.t. such
leakage, we show that there exists a scheme that
is secure w.r.t. any leakage parameter, under a
standard assumption, whose parameters depend
on the leakage parameter. We note that the only
other encryption scheme that is known to have
this property is based on a non-standard version
of the DDH assumption, which says that the
DDH assumption holds even if one of its secrets
is chosen from an arbitrary distribution with
sufficient min-entropy [7, 9].
We first prove the correctness of our scheme.
Claim 2. There exists a negligible function µ such
that for every n and every w ∈ {0, 1}m,
Pr[Ds(Es(w)) = w] = 1− µ(n)
Proof. Fix any n and any message w ∈ {0, 1}m.
Pr[(Ds(Es(w))) = w] =
Pr[∀i ∈ [m], (Ds(Es(w)))i = wi] =
Pr[∀i ∈ [m], (Ds(A,As+ x+ q2w))i = wi] =
Pr
[





















We next argue the security of this scheme.
Definition 2. We say that a symmetric encryption
scheme is CPA secure w.r.t. k(n)-weak keys, if for
any distribution {Dn}n∈N with min-entropy k(n),
the scheme is CPA secure even if the secret key is
chosen according to the distribution Dn.
Theorem 6. For any k = k(n), the encryption
scheme E = (G,E,D) is CPA secure with k(n)-
weak keys, under the (standard) DLWE`,q,γ as-
sumption, where ` = k−ω(logn)log q and where γ sat-
isfies γ/q = negl(n).
In order to prove Theorem 6, we use the follow-
ing notation: For any distribution D = {Dn}n∈N
we denote byGD the key generation algorithm that
samples the secret key s according to the distribu-
tion D. Namely, GD(1n) outputs s← Dn.
Theorem 4 implies that in order to prove The-
orem 6 it suffices to prove the following lemma,
which states that if the secret key is samples ac-
cording to some distribution D, rather than sam-
pled uniformly, then the scheme is secure under
the (non-standard) DLWEn,q,β(D) assumption.
Lemma 4. LetD = {Dn}n∈N be an arbitrary dis-
tribution with min-entropy k = k(n). Then, the
encryption scheme ED = (GD, E,D) is CPA se-
cure under the DLWEn,q,β(D) assumption.
4.2 Proof of Lemma 4
Let D = {Dn}n∈N be an arbitrary distribution
with min-entropy k = k(n). We will prove that
no PPT adversary can distinguish between the case
that it is given access to a valid encryption oracle
and the case that it is given access to an oracle that
simply outputs random strings. Suppose for the
sake of contradiction that there exists a PPT ad-
versary A that succeeds in distinguishing between
the two oracles with probability , where  is not a
negligible function. We will show that this implies
that there exists a polynomial t = poly(n) and a
PPT algorithm B such that
|Pr[B(A,As+ x) = 1]− Pr[B(A,u) = 1]| ≥ (n)
(2)
where A ∈R Zt×nq , s ← Dn and x ← (Ψβ)t.
This will contradict the DLWEn,q,β(D) assump-
tion. Algorithm B simply emulates A’s oracle.
Every time that A asks for an encryption of some
message w, the algorithm B takes m fresh rows of
his input, denoted by (A,y) and feeds A the ci-
phertext (A,y + q2w). We choose t so that t/m
is larger than the number of oracle queries that A
makes. Note that if the input of B is an LWE in-
stance then B perfectly simulates the encryption
oracle. On the other hand, if the input of B is ran-
dom, thenB perfectly simulates the random oracle.
Thus, Equation (2) indeed holds.
Using Theorem 5 and a proof along similar lines as
above, this scheme can also be shown to be secure
against uninvertible auxiliary inputs.
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5 Point Function Obfuscation with
Multibit Output
In this section we consider the task of obfuscat-
ing the class of point functions with multibit output
(or multi-bit point functions (MBPF) for short),
I = {I(k,m) | k,m ∈ {0, 1}∗},




m if x = k
⊥ otherwise
Namely, I(k,m) outputs the messagem given a cor-
rect key k, and ⊥ otherwise.
We show that our encryption scheme implies a
(weak) obfuscator for the class of multi-bit point
functions. To this end, we use a recent result of
Canetti et. al. [9] that shows a tight connection be-
tween encryption schemes with weak keys and a
weak form of obfuscation of multi-bit point func-
tions. The obfuscation definition they consider is
a distributional one: Rather than requiring the ob-
fuscation to be secure w.r.t. every function in the
class, as defined in the seminal work of [5], se-
curity is required only when the functions are dis-
tributed according to a distribution with sufficient
min-entropy.
Definition 3 (Obfuscation of Point Functions with
Multi-bit Output [9]). A multi-bit point function
(MBPF) obfuscator is a PPT algorithm O which
takes as input values (k,m) describing a function
I(k,m) ∈ I and outputs a circuit C.
Correctness: For all I(k,m) ∈ I with |k| =
n, |m| = poly(n), all x ∈ {0, 1}n,
Pr[C(x) 6= I(k,m)(x) |C ← O(I(k,m))] ≤ negl(n)
where the probability is taken over the randomness
of the obfuscator algorithm.
Polynomial Slowdown: For any k,m, the size
of the circuit C = O(I(k,m)) is polynomial in
|k|+ |m|.
Entropic Security: We say that the obfuscator
has α(n)-entropic security if for any PPT adver-
sary A with 1 bit output and any polynomial `(·),
there exists a PPT simulator S such that for every
distribution {Xn}n∈N, where Xn takes values in
{0, 1}n and H∞(Xn) ≥ α(n), and for every mes-
sage m ∈ {0, 1}`(n),∣∣Pr [A(O(I(k,m))) = 1]
−Pr
[
SI(k,m)(·) (1n) = 1
]∣∣∣ ≤ negl(n)
where the probability is taken over the randomness
of k ← Xn, the randomness of the obfuscator O
and the randomness of A,S.
Applying the work of [9] to our encryption
scheme, gives us the stronger notion of self-
composable obfuscation, defined below.
Definition 4 (Composability [9]). A multi-bit
point function obfuscatorO with α(n)-entropic se-
curity is said to be self-composable if for any PPT
adversary A with 1 bit output and any polynomial
`(·), there exists a PPT simulator S such that for
every distribution {Xn}n∈N withXn taking values
in {0, 1}n and H∞(Xn) ≥ α(n), and for every
m1, . . . ,mt ∈ {0, 1}`(n),
|Pr[A(O(I(k,m1)), . . . ,O(I(k,mt))) = 1]−
Pr[SI(k,m1)(·),...,I(k,mt)(·)(1n) = 1]| ≤ negl(n)
where the probabilities are over k ← Xn and over
the randomness of A,S,O.
Keeping Definitions 3 and 4 in mind, we can
finally state our result.
Theorem 7. There exists an obfuscator for the
class of point functions with multibit output which
is self-composable α(n)-entropic secure under the
DLWE`,q,γ assumption, where q = q(n) is super-
polynomial, ` = α(n)−ω(logn)log q and γ/q is negligi-
ble in n.
As was mentioned above, the proof of this theo-
rem follows from the tight connection between en-
cryptions scheme that are secure w.r.t. weak keys,
and multibit point function obfuscation. To state
this connection formally, we need the following
definition.
Definition 5 (Wrong-Key Detection [9, 12]). We
say that an encryption scheme E = (G,E,D)
satisfies the wrong-key detection property if for
all k 6= k′ ∈ {0, 1}n, and every message m ∈
{0, 1}poly(n), Pr[Dk′(Ek(m)) 6= ⊥] ≤ negl(n).
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Lemma 5. [9] Let E = (G,E,D) be an en-
cryption scheme with CPA security for α(n)-weak
keys and having the wrong-key detection prop-
erty. We define the obfuscator O which, on in-
put I(k,m), computes a ciphertext c = Ek(m) and
outputs the circuit Cc(·) (with hard-coded cipher-
text c) defined by Cc(x) = Dx(c). Then, O is a
self-composable multi-bit point function obfusca-
tor with α(n)-entropic security.
The proof of Theorem 7 follows immediately
from Lemma 5, Theorem 6, and the following
claim.
Claim 3. The encryption scheme E = (G,E,D),
defined in Section 4, has the wrong-key detection
property.
5.1 Proof of Claim 3
Let s, s′ ∈ {0, 1}n be any two distinct secret
keys, and let w ∈ {0, 1}m be any message.
Pr[Ds′(Es(w)) 6= ⊥] =
Pr
[








where A ∈R Zm×nq and x ← (Ψβ)m. The fact
that s 6= s′ implies that the vector A(s − s′) is
uniformly distributed in Zmq , and thus the vector
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